

# Port Risk Management

Building Resilience in a Changing Operational Environment

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Webinar CIP

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**SLOM**  
Sociedad Latinoamericana de  
Operadores de Terminales  
Marítimo Petroleros y Monoboyas



**CIP**

Comisión  
Interamericana de Puertos

**Have you ever seen a  
methanol fire?**



# Alternative Fuels

Some examples

LNG

LPG

Methyl/Ethyl  
Alcohols

Hydrogen

Ammonia

Biofuels

# Alternative Fuels

Physicochemical characteristics

**Baseline for comparison:** HFO

|                            | LNG | LPG | Methyl/Ethyl<br>Alcohols | Hydrogen | Ammonia |
|----------------------------|-----|-----|--------------------------|----------|---------|
| Flashpoint                 | ↓   | ↓   | ↓                        | ↓        | ↓       |
| Volatility                 | ↑   | ↑   | ↑                        | ↑        | ↑       |
| Toxicity                   | ↓   | ↓   | ↑ ↓                      | ↓        | ↑       |
| Density                    | ↓   | ↓   | ↓                        | ↓        | ↓       |
| Viscosity                  | ↓   | ↓   | ↓                        | ↓        | ↓       |
| Energy Density<br>(Mass)   | ↑   | ↑   | ↓                        | ↑        | ↓       |
| Energy Density<br>(Volume) | ↓   | ↓   | ↓                        | ↓        | ↓       |



# Working Groups

Maritime decarbonization



ConocoPhillips



ExxonMobil



YPF



石油海事協会



IACS  
International  
Association of  
Classification  
Societies



IMO



bsi.



SIGTTO

sgmf  
sea change.



WMU  
WORLD MARITIME UNIVERSITY

aramco



NESTE

World Fuel  
Services

Port of  
Rotterdam

PORT OF  
GOTHENBURG



Lloyd's  
Register

RINA



# Port resilience

Definition in this presentation

**The capacity to anticipate **changing risk scenarios**,**  
prevent or contain disruption, maintain essential  
operations, recover safely, and adapt from  
experience.

# Changing risk scenarios

In port operations

1. The evolving role of marine terminals in the **energy transition**.
2. Changing **weather**.

# **What is the role of marine terminals in the energy transition?**

# Marine terminals in the energy transition


Primary roles

1. Enable ships to **reduce** their **emissions**.
2. Enable the **flow** of **low-carbon fuels as cargo**.

**Terminals need to fulfill both roles while reducing their own emissions.**

# GHG emissions at marine terminals

Fourth IMO GHG Study 2020



Source: Fourth IMO GHG Study 2020. Available at:

<https://wwwcdn.imo.org/localresources/en/OurWork/Environment/Documents/Fourth%20IMO%20GHG%20Study%202020%20-%20Full%20report%20and%20annexes.pdf>

# Emissions from ships in a terminal operation

From ships  
at **nautical  
access**


From ships  
at  
**anchorage**

From ships  
at **berth**

From the  
**cargo  
operation**

# Reductions measures

GHG emissions from ships



## Options to reduce emissions from a ship:

1. To use a **low-carbon fuel**
2. To **capture and store emissions**
3. To use **less fuel**

*Low-carbon fuels*  
**At port**


# Alternative fuels in terminals

Cargo, bunkering, or ships using them


Terminals are enablers **of imports and exports of green fuels as cargo.**

**Bunkering of alternative fuels** will likely take place in terminal areas.


Non-chemical terminals may now operate with **ships using fuels that are hazardous chemicals.**



Source: <https://www.fluxys.com/en/projects/ammonia-antwerp-terminal>



Source: <https://www.gcformd.org/successful-ammonia-transfer-involving-major-shipping-names-marks-crucial-step-for-bunkering/>



Source: <https://www.gcformd.org/successful-ammonia-transfer-involving-major-shipping-names-marks-crucial-step-for-bunkering/>

# Alternative fuels

Examples of risks

**What is a lethal concentration of ammonia? 5000 ppm**

**Lethal Concentration:** 2500 - 4500 ppm in approximately 30 minutes

**Rapid Respiratory Arrest:** Above 5000 ppm[1]

**Calculating lethal volume of ammonia (gas) in an VLCC engine room: 200 m<sup>3</sup>**

**Engine Room Dimensions:** 40m (L) x 50m (W) x 20m (H) =  
40,000 m<sup>3</sup>

**Lethal Concentration:** 5000 ppm

**Required Gas Volume:** 40,000 m<sup>3</sup> x 5000 ppm / 1,000,000  
= 200 m<sup>3</sup> of ammonia gas

**Daily ammonia consumption of a VLCC = 282,500 m<sup>3</sup>**

**Typical HFO Consumption:** 100  
tons/day (full speed)

**Energy Density Comparison:** HFO  
(42 MJ/kg) vs. Ammonia (18.6  
MJ/kg) = 2.26 ratio


**Required Ammonia:** 100 tons/day  
x 2.26 = 226 tons/day

**Liquid Ammonia Volume:** 226  
tons / 0.680 tons/m<sup>3</sup> = 332 m<sup>3</sup>

**Ammonia Gas Volume:** 332 m<sup>3</sup>  
(liquid) x 850 (expansion factor) =  
282,500 m<sup>3</sup> of ammonia gas

[1] Birken GA, Fabri PJ, Carey LC. Acute ammonia intoxication complicating multiple trauma. J Trauma. 1981 Sep;21(9):820-2.

# Deterioration of cargo transfer hose due to exposure to high biodiesel (FAME) content




# Alternative fuels in ships and terminals

Managing change

Ships and Terminals should consider the impact on the following elements when performing a **management of change** to operate handling green fuels:

- **Training** and management of **personnel**.
- **Operational procedures** and the ship/shore interface.
- New and existing **equipment**.
- **Inspection and maintenance** programs.
- **Emergency** preparedness.

The principles in **TMSA** and **MTMSA** can help operators update their management systems to operate with green fuels.



To capture emissions  
**At port**

# Capture and control at berth

California



# Technologies available

Emissions capture and control at berth



# Incident

Emissions capture and control at berth




# Risk mapping

## Emissions capture and control at berth

|                                                                                                                                          |                                                                                       |                                                                                                  |                                                                                                              |                                                                                                 |                                                                                                         |                                                                                                                                                            |                                                                                                                                  |
|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Insufficient power supply from the electrical grid for the potential demand                                                              | Potential operation of non-hazardous zone compliant boom within hazardous zone        | Lack of sufficient ECC collector to stack relative position keeping                              | Potential risk of collision/allision of the ECC barge with one the following during approach and departure   | Potential electrical short circuit and static discharge upon contact of stack adaptor to stacks | Potential damage to underground pipelines or cables at port from spud or jack-up solution for ECC barge | The ECC barge causes the tanker to not safely meet the minimum regulatory requirement regarding evacuation time from the berth (30 minutes for California) | Potential interference of the technology with normal tanker operations (interference with tanker's discharges or mooring system) |
| Potential non-compliance with the terminal engineering and maintenance standards requirements while using capture and control technology | Inadequate spud design for the floating-facility-based capture and control technology | Lack of compatibility with existing tankers                                                      | Impact from floating-facility-based capture and control technology on the port/terminal manoeuvring area     | Impact of crew competence on the system's reliability and safety of the operation               | The effects of emission capture and control on emergency response                                       | Insufficient pier strength for the equipment needed                                                                                                        | Potential fire or explosion from the technology in the event of an oil spill/loss of cargo containment                           |
| Potential environmental impact assessment (increased emissions) from continuous operations of floating units using DP system             | Loss of barge stability                                                               | Mooring system failure                                                                           | High air draft of the capture and control system                                                             | Inadequate capacity of capturing emissions                                                      | Human exposure during connection / disconnection                                                        | Excessive back pressure                                                                                                                                    | Improper material selection resulting in spark generation                                                                        |
| Insufficient personnel                                                                                                                   | Limited visibility                                                                    | Hazardous fluids on the barge                                                                    | High quantity of unburnt fuel in the exhaust stream due to malfunction/standard operations of ship equipment | Loss of containment of exhaust gas in the capture system                                        | Reverse flow of exhaust gas in the accommodation block                                                  | Cross-contamination of ship's systems                                                                                                                      | Inability to comply with regulation (liability)                                                                                  |
| Failure of control system on the barge                                                                                                   | SIMOPs                                                                                | Contact between emissions collection system (including the potentially heavy hood) and the stack | Damage to the emissions capture boom due to shipboard operations                                             | Barge crew evacuation and egress                                                                | Loss of power on the barge                                                                              | Failures of spud deployment and retrieval equipment                                                                                                        | Man overboard due to slip, trip, fall                                                                                            |
| Lack of regulation standards related to construction                                                                                     | Personnel transfer from ECC barge to ship                                             | H2S risk to barge personnel                                                                      | Pressure surge from boiler resulting in ignition                                                             | Impact from detachable bonnet that would remain on board and attached to the funnel             | Capture bonnet blocks the top of the stack                                                              | Barge crane failure lowering the capture bonnet on the top of the stack                                                                                    |                                                                                                                                  |

# Safety guide

## Emissions capture and control at berth



Considerations for  
explosive  
atmosphere

ECC collector, boom,  
and ductwork design  
and compatibility

Safe positioning of  
the ECC collector to  
the tanker stacks or  
funnel

Barge's manoeuvring  
and station-keeping,  
including emergency  
scenarios

Tanker departure in  
case of an  
emergency

Potential impacts to  
tanker machinery  
and ECC technology

Risks associated with  
hazardous  
substances on ECC  
barge

ECC Safety  
Management

Competency and  
training of ECC  
personnel

Manning  
requirements

Human factors

Process safety-  
critical equipment

Redundancy and  
secondary means of  
operations of ECC  
equipment

Barge design and  
construction  
verification

Communication  
protocols

To use less fuel  
**At port**


# Onshore Power Supply

Using less fuel at port

An **OPS system connects a ship to the terminal's electrical grid** using high-voltage cables.

Once connected, the **ship can stop using its own generators** and switch to shore power instead.


The system includes equipment for controlling **voltage and frequency, protection, grounding, cable handling, and safely connecting** the terminal to the ship.



# Challenge for tankers

Hazardous areas

- The **cable properties must be** suitable for the hazardous area.
- Parts of the **Cable Management System** cross hazardous zones.







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# Risk mapping

## OPS for tankers

Threats being covered:




# Safety guide

OPS for tankers

## Executive summary:

- The guide is divided into three parts: **tanker**, **terminal**, and **interface**.
  - Each part covers: **design**, **operation**, **inspection** & **maintenance**, **training**.
- The shore power connection should follow IEC/IEEE 80005 Series Standards, as amended.
- The provision of OPS at **6.6 kV, 60 Hz** as standard is recommended.
- The OPS system may have **1, 2, or 3 cables**, depending on the power demand of the typical design ship.
- A specific standardized plug and socket type is recommended.
- The relative installation location of the ship/shore connection is not prescribed but is left to the involved parties' discretion based on case-specific evaluations.
- A risk assessment is critical, emphasizing safety related to hazardous areas.




### Available at:


<https://www.ocimf.org/document-library/onshore-power-supply-systems-1>

# Other elements covered


OPS for tankers



Nominal current per connection requirement.




Connector design and nominal capacity.



Class-type approved requirements.



Cable design.



Scalable number of cables and ship's inlets.



Cable lifting and payout requirements.



Cable storage and parking requirement.



Cable tension and movement monitoring.




Bonding or control.



OPS shutdown and emergency decoupling

# **How is the changing weather affecting marine terminal operations?**



# We are observing **extreme climate events** much more frequently.

Climate change can make historical design assumptions less reliable.

Operators should review whether the wind, wave, current, rainfall, and compound-event criteria used to design jetties, offshore berths, and other marine infrastructure continue to reflect current and future operating conditions.

New times bring new challenges  
and opportunities.

**But one thing remains the  
same...**


# People are key!

**The change is already here** due to the evolving role of marine terminals in the energy transition and changing weather, and this shift is accelerating.

Ensuring **people are trained and competent** is crucial to safe, resilient operations.

Our teams will play a key role in preparing the **next generation of professionals** to manage the new risks.

**We are a key piece** in sharing knowledge and educating our workforce.



# XXII Jornada SLOM

14-16 October 2026

Cartagena de Indias, Colombia



Please let me know if you have any questions.

# Thank you

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